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Abstract: Urban economists have long understood the theoretical importance 
of transportation infrastructure and accessibility on the location choice of 
households and firms. We utilize a readily available data set of transaction 
rents in the Chicago metropolitan area to investigate the determinants of 
industrial property rents. Among the factors considered are proximity to 
transportation infrastructure, characteristics of the property, the term 
structure of lease agreements, and local attributes of the neighborhood. 
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Empirical results suggest property, lease, and local demographics play 
important roles in determining rents. Despite the fact that industrial property 
tends to locate very close to rail lines and interstate highways, transportation 
infrastructure has much less influence. There is evidence that there is an 
upward sloping lease term structure premium and that the premium varies 
over time. The model is also used to develop a constant quality rent index for 
the Chicago commercial property market. Compared to average rents and 
asking rents, the estimated constant quality index shows a smaller run up in 
rents from 2003 through 2008 and a larger drop off in rents through the end 
of 2011. 
Keywords: Commercial property; Lease term structure; Transportation 
infrastructure; Hedonic 
1. Introduction and motivation 
Urban location models emphasize the importance of accessibility 
in firm and household location choices. Transportation expenditures 
and logistic costs account for 4.8% and 7.7% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), respectively,2 making transportation a central 
component of total costs for most businesses and an important 
component of GDP for the nation as a whole. In this paper, we study 
the industrial property market in the Chicago metropolitan area. The 
dominant form of industrial property in Chicago is warehouses, which 
are quintessentially transportation hubs. They function as the location 
where goods are collected from input sources and distributed to retail 
locations or to other firms. In fact, approximately one third of all US 
rail freight originates in, passes through, or terminates in Chicago. In 
terms of container volume, Chicago is the fourth largest handler 
behind Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai (DiJohn, 2010). In terms 
of square feet of leasable space in the Chicago metropolitan area, 
industrial property is much larger than office space or retail space. 
According to CoStar market reports, industrial property was 
1,116,416,637 square feet, office property was 461,145,884 square 
feet, and retail property was 511,142,814 square feet of rentable 
space in the fourth quarter of 2012. Clearly, warehouses and 
associated industrial properties are especially important components of 
the economy for cities like Chicago and their surrounding areas. 
In this paper, we examine how property, location, and lease 
characteristics determine rents for industrial property in the Chicago 
metropolitan area. The paper contributes to current knowledge on the 
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determinants of property rents by including a detailed examination of 
the value of different attributes of industrial properties using a hedonic 
regression analysis. We observe the clustering of industrial property 
around airports, rail lines, and interstate highways and ask whether 
there is any rent premium associated with this clustering. We also 
observe a variety of lease terms (i.e., the length of the lease contract). 
Empirical tests are conducted to evaluate the lease term structure 
premium and its stability over time. Finally, the hedonic findings are 
used to derive a constant quality rent index, which can be compared 
with the information that is typically used by market participants. 
Commercial brokers and brokerage firms provide extensive 
information to potential clients on property availability, market 
conditions, and prospective rents at different locations. Brokerage real 
estate firms such as Cushman and Wakefield are a common source of 
rents that landlords offer tenants at the beginning of negotiations. This 
is often referred to as the “asking rent”. In addition, brokers often post 
listings on a centralized web site such as CoStar, which also reports 
average rents for all transactions. However, does this information 
accurately reflect market conditions? One limitation of inter-temporal 
comparisons of average rents is that the average property may change 
qualitatively over time. We find that compared to the constant quality 
rents derived in this paper, average asking rents and average 
transaction rents overstated the increase in rents when the market 
was expanding and subsequently missed the timing of the peak of the 
real estate market cycle. This divergence can have implications for 
policies and programs targeting industrial properties, industrial–urban 
development, and the efficiency of industrial property markets. 
2. Relevant literature 
The role of rents in the urban environment and the capitalization 
of those rents into prices have been the subject of ongoing research 
for many decades. Indeed, von Thünen showed the link between 
agricultural land prices and proximity to markets in his book The 
Isolated State, in 1826. The hedonic method was first used by Waugh 
(1928) to model agricultural markets, and it was further enhanced by 
Lancaster (1966) as well as Griliches, 1967 and Griliches, 1971. Rosen 
(1974) formalized a two-stage model to derive implicit market demand 
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functions and many subsequent studies have examined the role of 
both structural and site location attributes on property values. 
Recognizing that there are no explicit market values for specific 
characteristics (e.g., floor size) of certain goods or services (e.g., 
rental properties), hedonic pricing reveals the implicit prices for each 
individual attribute from the observed market value of the asset. In 
the context of leased space, the rental rate represents the value the 
renter places on the physical attributes of the space and building, the 
attributes of the location, and the attributes of the lease as well as the 
supply of these attributes in the market. 
Rents are part of a larger structural model where firms must 
decide whether to own property or rent it while at the same time 
finding the best location and best lease structure. Similar to many 
prior research efforts, our research conducts a reduced form approach 
that analyzes the outcome (the rent level) that incorporates all of 
these factors.3 Although much of the prior hedonic research has 
focused on single-family residential property markets, there has been 
an increase in interest in commercial property values and rents(e.g., 
Ambrose, 1990, Brounen and Jennen, 2009, Chegut et al., 2011, 
Cutter and DeWoody, 2010, Fehribach et al., 1993, Slade, 2000, 
Munneke and Slade, 2000, Munneke and Slade, 2001, Sivitanidou and 
Wheaton, 1992, Sivitanidou and Sivitanides, 1995, Sivitanidou, 1995, 
Jennen and Brounen, 2009, Brunauer et al., 2010 and Conroy and 
Milosch, 2011)4, and some of that literature examines industrial 
property rents (Ambrose, 1990, Sivitanidou and Sivitanides, 1995, 
Sivitanidou, 1995 and Ryan, 2005). Most of these studies rely on a 
fairly small sample of observations that was accessed through a local 
brokerage firm. The findings are mixed. For example, Sivitanidou and 
Sivitanides (1995) examined the determinants of 461asking rents in 
Los Angeles. The results indicate that freeway density, proximity to 
freeway intersections, and proximity to a major airport all had a 
positive and significant impact on industrial rents. Sivitanidou (1995) 
finds similar results on warehouse and distribution asking rents in the 
Los Angeles area, but she finds differences between large (i.e., more 
than 45,000 sq. ft.) and small properties (i.e., between 10,000 and 
45,000 sq. ft.) properties. Specifically, the impact of proximity to 
transportation infrastructure (i.e., airports, highways) is more 
pronounced for larger properties. 
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Renters will only pay a premium for these types of locations if 
there is sufficient demand relative to the supply. Major international 
airports (e.g., LAX (Los Angeles international airport) and O'Hare) are 
just the types of locations that are likely to have some intrinsic value 
and are limited in supply. As a result, transportation related firms are 
likely to compete, bidding against each other to be close to large 
international airports and as a result, drive up rents. In contrast, 
interstate highways and railways are much more ubiquitous in most 
cities and metropolitan areas. Thus, we should expect that the 
premiums associated with these types of transportation infrastructure 
may be more muted or may not exist at all. 
Finally, a number of studies examine the influence of the lease 
term structure (Ambrose and Yildirim, 2008, Bond et al., 2008, 
Clapham and Gunnelin, 2003, Englund et al., 2004, Englund et al., 
2008 and Gunnelin and Soderberg, 2003) on property rents. Most of 
these studies find that there is a positive relationship between the 
length of the lease term and the rent. However, before the downturn 
in the early 1990s, long-term rents were lower than short term rents 
for office space in Stockholm Sweden. In general, the evidence 
indicates that long-term rents do tend to predict short term rents but 
they are underestimated. This indicates that market participants may 
be able to, at least partially, predict future declines in rents. These 
results imply that a rent index should hold constant not just location 
and property characteristics but also lease term and potentially other 
lease attributes. 
This paper contributes to these lines of literature by developing 
a hedonic model of industrial rents in the Chicago metropolitan area, 
and controlling for a wide range of determinants including 
characteristics of the property, access to transportation infrastructure, 
neighborhood features, and the term structure of the lease agreement. 
The hedonic model is estimated over a recent time period, which 
includes large macroeconomic shocks to the economy and we develop 
a constant quality industrial rent index to track changes in rents over 
the business cycle. The remainder of the paper reviews the hedonic 
model, presents the data, introduces the empirical results, and 
provides a discussion of the results and conclusion. 
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3. Empirical specification and data 
We estimate several semi-log hedonic models using an ordinary 
least squares model (OLS) and a spatial error model (SEM). The 
specification includes the attributes of the property, the location, and 
the lease, 
ln(r)=βX+γ     (1) 
 
where r is the n × 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable 
(real rent per square foot per year), β is the k × 1 vector of regression 
parameters to be estimated empirically, X is the n × k matrix of 
observation on k explanatory variables, and γ is a n × 1 vector of 
errors. The vector of explanatory variables X consists of hedonic 
characteristics of the property (i.e., structural attributes such as 
building age, drive-ins, parking ratio, etc.), characteristics of the 
location of each building relative to transportation infrastructure (i.e., 
distance to the closest airport, rail line, water port, and intermodal 
points), lease attributes (i.e., the year when the lease is signed, lease 
type, use, occupancy, and lease purpose) and local neighborhood 
characteristics (i.e., distance to commuter rail stations, the fraction of 
the population that is nonwhite, median age, population density, and 
average household age). 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the variables in the 
estimation data set. The data on the rental properties is collected from 
CoStar for the Chicago metropolitan area for leases signed to occupy 
space in industrial properties. For market participants, CoStar is one of 
the largest providers of commercial real estate information. CoStar's 
database contains more than 77 billion square feet of inventory, 1.5 
million listings, and 10.6 million images of properties. The primary 
users of CoStar are commercial property brokers. CoStar collects the 
data by contacting property owners, brokers, and local government 
officials for information. Individuals can enter a listing into the system 
and CoStar independently verifies the listing. While not identical, 
CoStar resembles the single family market Multiple Listing Service 
(MLS) run by the National Association of REALTORS®. However, unlike 
the MLS, CoStar is a for profit company listed on NASDAQ. CoStar 
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does provide a unique view of the market place because it covers all 
property that is marketed, not just investment grade property. 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Property 
Parking ratio (parking 
spaces per 1000 square 
feet of gross leasable 
area) 
1735 1.46 1.04 0.01 10.00 
No. drive-ins/1000 square 
feet 
2645 0.14 0.24 0.00 6.00 
Year built 2645 1,982.42 19.98 1,860.00 2,010.00 
Lease square feet 2645 34,058.06 71,316.97 108.00 915,643.00 
Distance to water port 
(miles) 
2645 24.28 11.23 2.26 81.03 
Distance to airport (miles) 2645 11.49 10.20 0.00 76.76 
Distance small airport 
(miles) 
2645 8.41 5.05 0.00 21.12 
Distance to railroad 
(miles) 
2645 0.69 0.93 0.00 5.80 
Distance to interstate 
highway (miles) 
2645 1.84 2.05 0.00 14.57 
Distance to intermodal 
point (miles) 
2645 4.12 4.76 0.01 25.13 
Minimum ceiling height 
(feet) 
2522 18.41 5.90 7.00 40.00 
Cranes 2645 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Rail access 2645 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Owned by tenant 2645 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Lease 
Rent (real dollars per 
square foot per year in 
2012—July–December 
dollars) 
2645 7.14 2.94 0.69 32.05 
Subleased (excluded 
leased) 
2645 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Single tenant (excluded 
multi-tenant) 
2645 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Full service 2645 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Modified gross (excluded 
net) 
2645 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Office 2645 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Flex 2645 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Retail (excluded 
warehouse) 
2645 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Lease term (years) 1442 4.09 2.73 0.19 25.02 
Year leased signed 2645 2,008.51 2.36 2,003.00 2,012.00 
Demographics and the local market 
Nonwhite fractiona 2645 0.22 0.19 0.02 1.00 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol 56 (January 2016): pg. 34-45. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
8 
 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Median age (10s of years) 
a 
2645 3.48 0.47 2.01 6.41 
Density (population per 
square mile in 10,000s) a 
2645 0.28 0.40 0.00 3.57 
Average household sizea 2645 2.81 0.38 1.56 4.21 
Distance to commuter rail 
(miles) 
2645 2.88 2.96 0.01 38.14 
Distance to city center 
(miles) 
2645 23.34 11.50 0.86 80.97 
aLocal market data are collected from the 2000 Census at the census tract level. 
The average real rent in Chicago in July–December 2012 dollars 
is $7.14 per square foot per year, with substantial variation as 
indicated by a standard deviation of $2.94. Real rents are calculated 
by normalizing nominal rents by the urban Consumer Price Index 
excluding housing and are in second half of 2012 dollars per square 
foot. These are transaction rents (i.e., the rent paid in the first month 
at the time of the transaction) but they do not include additional perks 
used to entice tenants such as a first month free rent or free operating 
expenses. Therefore, the rents may be smoothed relative to effective 
rents and may miss the timing of any downturn in rents as landlords 
attempt to maintain published rents while reducing the actual rent 
through unpublished concessions. However, compared to asking rents 
we would expect these rents to be less smooth and to time the market 
more accurately (Webb and Fisher, 1996). The majority of tenants use 
the rented space for warehouse purposes. A small minority use the 
space for office, retail, or flex purposes, but these uses are being 
conducted in an industrial property, not in an office building or a retail 
building. This was confirmed by a visual inspection of property photos 
when the data was collected. The buildings are best described as 
generic boxes often found in industrial parks. 
3.1. Property attributes 
There are 2645 observed lease transactions. Unfortunately, 
some of the independent variables have missing data for some of the 
observations. To avoid having to drop these observations, when a 
variable has missing values we use a categorical approach. For 
example, 1735 of the 2645 leases report the parking ratio, defined as 
the number of parking spaces per 1000 square feet of gross leasable 
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area. For the 910 observations with missing values for parking ratio, 
we define a dummy variable equal to one; otherwise, the variable is 
zero. The non-missing observations categorize the property as having 
parking ratios in one of four categories (i.e., parking ratio ≤ 1; 
1 < parking ratio ≤ 1.5; 1.5 < parking ratio ≤ 2; and parking 
ratio > 2). While there is no expected sign on the missing data dummy 
variables, it is anticipated that tenants are willing to pay more per 
square foot when it is associated with more parking. This is consistent 
with the findings of Cutter and DeWoody (2010), who show that onsite 
and nearby public parking can confer pricing premiums for commercial 
property. The ability of a delivery truck to “drive in” the building 
should also confer value. The number of drive-ins is normalized by 
thousands of leasable square feet of the property, No. drive-ins/(1000 
square feet). Consistent with empirical evidence for office property 
( Ryan, 2005, Eichholtz et al., 2010, Slade, 2000, Brounen and 
Jennen, 2009, Cutter and DeWoody, 2010, Wiley et al., 2010, Miller et 
al., 2008 and Munneke and Slade, 2000), we expect that more 
recently built or renovated industrial property, as measured by the 
variable year built, should have a higher rent. It is anticipated that 
larger leases, measured by lease square feet, will pay lower rents 
because of lower per square foot operating costs, simpler set up of the 
space, more tenant power in the lease negotiation process, often 
higher tenant credit quality, and perhaps the increased difficulty of 
leasing larger spaces. However, it is important to note that prior 
empirical evidence is mixed with some ( Ryan, 2005) finding the 
expected negative sign for industrial rents in some areas but not in 
others (i.e., the East County and Centre City markets in San Diego, 
although not for the South Bay area) and others (Jennen and Brounen, 
2009 and Brounen and Jennen, 2009) finding a positive relationship 
for office property. The distance from the floor to the ceiling, 
measured by minimum ceiling height, can be a key amenity for 
efficiently storing goods in a warehouse. We expect that higher ceilings 
will command a higher rent. Indicators are also included for the 
existence of a crane (cranes) and access to rail (rail access). Both of 
these attributes should be associated with higher rent. The last 
property characteristic is whether the property is owned by the tenant 
(owned by tenant). This is included to proxy for any incentives a joint 
owner–renter has to pay rents above or below market rates. These 
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incentives may include the desire to have sufficient returns from 
property ownership or perhaps tax incentives. 
One of the key attributes of industrial property is access to 
major modes of transportation. In the Chicago area, this includes 
access to a large airport (i.e., O'Hare and Midway, and even Mitchell 
Field in Milwaukee for those in the northern regions of the Chicago 
Metropolitan area). We compute the distance of the property to ports 
on Lake Michigan to rail lines, to the interstate highway system, and to 
intermodal points where goods can be transferred from one mode of 
transportation to another (e.g., rail to air, rail to truck, or rail to port).5 
The average distance to airport is almost 11.5 miles, and the average 
distance to water port is approximately 24 miles. We also include 
measures of distance to small or regional airports, distance to small 
airport. Industrial rental property is found to be most aggressively 
clustered around interstates and rail lines. The average distance to an 
interstate highway is just under 2 miles, and the average distance to 
rail is less than 1 mile. The average distance to intermodal point is 
4.1 miles. We anticipate that being closer to transportation modes and 
intermodal points is valuable to industrial property users and should be 
associated with a real rent premium. 
Fig. 1 reaffirms the importance of transportation infrastructure 
for industrial property. The dots indicate the location of the leases 
included in the estimation data set. The leases are clustered around 
O'Hare airport, with gray shading indicated an airport and along key 
highway and rail lines. Note that there are very few leases that are not 
near rail lines, highways, or an airport. Thus, the relative importance 
of the mode of transportation and the sensitivity of tenants to the 
availability of the various modes is an empirical question. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol 56 (January 2016): pg. 34-45. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
11 
 
 
Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of leases in the Chicago metropolitan area: roads, rail, and 
airports. 
Leases are indicated by dots. Rail lines are indicated by the lines with dashes. Airports 
are indicated by the grey areas. Interstate highways are indicated by the double lines 
and other major roads by the smaller less dense lines. 
The empirical evidence on whether access to transportation 
infrastructure is capitalized into rents and prices is mixed. Fehribach et 
al. (1993) find evidence of this negative relationship between the 
distance to an airport and industrial property prices. Brounen and 
Jennen (2009) find an office rent premium associated with the 
proximity to train stations and lower rents nearer to a highway 
junction, and Ryan (2005) finds that being located near highway 
ramps or light rail transit stations is mostly insignificant for industrial 
property rents. Using state-level data, Cohen and Paul (2007) show 
that higher levels of public highway or airport infrastructure are 
capitalized into industrial property value for manufacturing firms, and 
Chegut et al. (2011) find mixed results for office leases. Finally, as 
noted earlier, Sivitanidou (1995) finds some indication of differential 
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premiums in asking rents of access to transportation infrastructure for 
firms renting larger versus smaller spaces. 
3.2. Lease attributes 
How the space is occupied may also affect rents. Leases can be 
directly or indirectly leased from the original tenant (subleased). A 
small fraction (approximately 2%) of our leases are subleased. The 
impact of this variable is an empirical question and potentially could 
vary over the business cycle. When only one tenant (single tenant) 
occupies the whole building, the landlord is subject to more tenant risk 
(i.e., risk of default by the tenant). If a tenant vacates, then all of the 
expected cash flow will be lost until a new tenant is found. Therefore, 
turnover risk is very high. This risk should drive single tenant rents up 
relative to multiple tenant lease buildings, and hence we would expect 
a positive sign on its coefficient. 
Leases can also be categorized based on who pays the operating 
expenses of the property. In a full service lease, the landlord pays all 
the operating expenses (full service). In a modified gross lease, the 
tenant and landlord share the operating expenses (modified gross). 
While the mechanism of the sharing can take a myriad of forms, a 
common structure is for the landlord to cover the expenses up to a 
certain value, with the tenant paying for all additional expenses. This 
is often called an expense stop and is frequently set to the expenses in 
the year before the lease is signed. The last type of lease is called a 
net lease. In a net lease, the tenant typically pays all the operating 
expenses except the management fee (net). There are again many 
variations where certain expenses are treated as net, such as utilities, 
and other types of expenses are treated as gross, such as garbage and 
cleaning common areas. In general, we should expect that rent on 
leases should be highest for full service, next highest for modified 
gross, and lowest for net. For example, Eichholtz et al. (2010) find 
that gross office rents are 4% higher than those quoted net of utilities. 
The use of the property may also affect the rent. For example, if 
office space has a higher turnover cost, then these costs should be 
capitalized into the rent. One component of turnover cost is the extent 
to which the landlord must improve or adjust the space to meet the 
needs of the tenant. These costs are likely highest for retail (retail) 
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and office (office) space because they require meeting spaces, 
hallways, offices, and cubicles. In contrast, warehouse space requires 
very little additional infrastructure provided by the landlord. In 
practice, the extent to which the landlord covers tenant improvement 
costs is a negotiating point; typically, the landlord provides a tenant 
an improvement allowance which will only cover some of the costs. 
Overall, we expect that warehouse space use pays the lowest rent due 
to lower turnover costs and the need for fewer amenities and tenant 
improvements. 
The last attribute of the lease is how long it lasts (lease term). 
Leases in the industrial property market can be very short or very 
long. The average lease term is just over 4 years, and the longest in 
the data is approximately 25 years. Under the pure expectations 
hypothesis, long-term leases reflect the geometric mean of all future 
short term leases. However, longer term leases have lower turnover 
risk for the landlord but more releasing risk for the tenant. In addition, 
the credit quality of the tenant has substantial impacts in term 
structure. The empirical evidence is that longer term leases tend to 
have higher rental rates but some of the evidence is mixed ( Ambrose 
and Yildirim, 2008, Bond et al., 2008, Clapham and Gunnelin, 2003, 
Englund et al., 2004, Englund et al., 2008 and Gunnelin and 
Soderberg, 2003). 
3.3. Demographics and local neighborhood features 
A warehouse also needs to attract a workforce and numerous 
authors (Timothy and Wheaton, 2001, McMillan and Singell, 
1992 and Eberts, 1981) find the existence of positively sloped intracity 
wage gradients. Sivitanidou (1995) focuses on the role of spatial 
amenities including worker related amenities. Thus, there is a balance 
between locating industrial firms close enough to their workforce such 
that wages can be kept relatively low, but far enough away so that 
non-productive amenities (e.g., absence of noise, traffic, etc.) that are 
important to households are not also capitalized into the industrial 
rents. To proxy for potential local amenities and location preferences 
we include demographic measures at the census tract level from the 
2000 Census. These include the density of the population (density), 
the median age of the population (median age), the average size of 
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households (average household size), and the fraction of the 
population that is not white (nonwhite fraction). In addition, it should 
be easier to attract workers when the building is close to a commuter 
transit terminal. To measure this worker amenity, we include the 
distance in miles to the nearest commuter transit terminal (distance to 
commuter rail). The average distance is 2.9 miles, although there is 
considerable variability with the standard deviation exceeding the 
mean. To control for access to downtown the distance to city center 
measured in miles is also included. The average of distance to city 
center is 23.3 miles, suggesting that most warehousing is located well 
outside the higher land cost areas of the city. If warehouses are willing 
to pay premiums for being close to their desired workforce (i.e., 
locations the workforce cares about), they must outbid other potential 
uses for the land and pay higher industrial rents.6 
3.4. Distributions of some key attributes 
Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 provide the distribution of a few 
key attributes. Table 2 shows the average rent per square foot (psf) in 
nominal and real terms for each year that the lease is signed. The data 
are very sparse in the early years of the sample, but there are over 
100 transactions reported in 2003 and earlier. The peak year, in terms 
of transactions observed, is 2010 where 453 leases were recorded. 
The 226 observed transactions in 2012 include leases signed up to 
November 1st of that year. The distribution of rents is also very wide. 
Table 3 reports the number of leases per value in 2 dollar increments. 
The most prevalent category is 6 to 8 dollars psf in both nominal and 
real terms. The distribution of the lease size measured in square feet 
is skewed left as shown in Table 4, indicating a large group of small 
leases and a modest group of tenants with very large leases. This may 
reflect the use of the space and the type of industry in which the 
company is involved. 
Table 2. Rents by signing date. 
Year 
Number of 
leases 
Average 
nominal 
price 
Standard 
deviation 
nominal price 
Average real 
rent (2012 
dollars) 
Standard 
deviation real rent 
(2012 dollars) 
2003& 
earlier 
124 5.96 2.19 7.58 2.78 
2004 91 6.10 2.17 7.55 2.68 
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Year 
Number of 
leases 
Average 
nominal 
price 
Standard 
deviation 
nominal price 
Average real 
rent (2012 
dollars) 
Standard 
deviation real rent 
(2012 dollars) 
2005 99 6.00 2.20 7.19 2.63 
2006 151 6.42 1.93 7.45 2.24 
2007 352 7.00 2.46 7.89 2.77 
2008 369 6.86 2.61 7.45 2.83 
2009 438 6.64 2.74 7.23 2.99 
2010 453 6.51 3.03 6.98 3.25 
2011 342 6.21 2.91 6.45 3.03 
2012 226 5.93 2.68 6.03 1.71 
All 
Leases 
2645 6.49 2.68 7.14 2.94 
Rent is nominal or real second half of 2012 dollars per square foot per year. 
Table 3. Description of nominal and real rental rates. 
 Distribution of nominal rents 
 
Distribution of real rents 
 
Rent ($ psf/year) 
Number of 
leases 
Percentage of 
leases 
Number of 
leases 
Percentage of 
leases 
Rent ≤ 2 28 1 21 1 
2 < Rent ≤ 4 398 15 257 10 
4 < Rent ≤ 6 804 30 687 26 
6 < Rent ≤ 8 916 35 775 29 
8 < Rent ≤ 10 322 12 600 23 
10 < Rent ≤ 12 104 4 173 7 
12 < Rent ≤ 14 29 1 79 3 
14 < Rent ≤ 16 23 1 20 1 
16 < Rent ≤ 18 8 0 11 0 
18 < Rent 13 0 22 1 
All leases 2645 100 2,645 100 
Rent is dollars (nominal or 2012 real) per square foot per year. 
Table 4. Lease square feet. 
Square feet of lease Number of leases Percentage of leases 
Square feet ≤ 5,000 974 37 
5,000 < Square feet ≤ 10,000 458 17 
10,000 < Square feet ≤ 20,000 366 14 
20,000 < Square feet ≤ 30,000 185 7 
30,000 < Square feet ≤ 40,000 117 4 
40,000 < Square feet ≤ 50,000 90 3 
50,000 < Square feet ≤ 60,000 72 3 
60,000 < Square feet ≤ 70,000 45 2 
70,000 < Square feet ≤ 80,000 35 1 
80,000 < Square feet ≤ 90,000 21 1 
90,000 < Square feet ≤ 100,000 28 1 
100,000 < Square feet ≤ 110,000 34 1 
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Square feet of lease Number of leases Percentage of leases 
110,000 < Square feet ≤ 120,000 24 1 
120,000 < Square feet ≤ 130,000 25 1 
130,000 < Square feet ≤ 140,000 22 1 
140,000 < Square feet ≤ 150,000 14 1 
150,000 < Square feet 135 5 
All leases 2,645 100 
The square feet of the lease signed. 
4. Empirical results 
Table 5a and Table 5b report the regression model findings. We 
present findings from a simple OLS model that allows errors to be 
correlated and clustered within markets areas. In the Appendix, we 
present a spatial error model (SEM).7 Since the SEM and OLS results 
are very similar, we report in the body of the text and all future 
specification tests using the OLS estimation approach.8 The 
explanatory variables are broken down into property attributes, lease 
attributes, time period dummies, and local neighborhood 
characteristics. The explanatory power of the regression is reasonable 
with adjusted R2 = 0.54. Market areas were defined by CoStar. The 
appendix provides a brief description of the market areas. These areas 
will be used to cluster the errors and for fixed effects. The results, as 
shown in Table 5a and Table 5b, mostly meet expectations in terms of 
sign, and many of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 
10% level or better. The market area fixed effects are reported in the 
Appendix A. The first column represents result without market area 
fixed effects and the second column the results with fixed effects. 
Fixed effects is the preferred specification because it controls for any 
unobserved time invariant characteristics associated with each market. 
This could relate to building standards, road, or other infrastructure 
quality and overall desirability of the market. The results are therefore 
identified by variation across buildings, leases, and time within each 
market. 
Table 5a. Results—Part 1. 
  
Basic 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Category Variable Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
 
Intercept − 3.032** − 2.73 − 2.750*** − 3.20 
Property Parking ratio = . − 0.053** − 2.42 − 0.038* − 1.80 
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Basic 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Category Variable Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
(excluded: park 
ratio > 2) 
Parking ratio ≤ 1.0 − 0.102*** − 4.20 − 0.102*** − 4.68 
 
1.0 < Parking 
ratio ≤ 1.5 
− 0.058*** − 2.92 − 0.064*** − 3.42 
 
1.5 < Parking 
ratio ≤ 2.0 
0.003 0.15 − 0.010 − 0.38 
 
No. drive-ins/1,000 
square feet 
0.076 1.37 0.112* 1.75 
 
Year built (100s) 0.004*** 6.21 0.004*** 7.88 
 
Log(lease square feet) − 0.150*** − 12.63 − 0.148*** − 12.67 
(excluded: 
ceiling ≤ 12) 
Ceiling = . 0.008 0.17 0.049 1.06 
 
12 < Ceiling ≤ 14 0.046 1.04 0.017 0.52 
 
14 < Ceiling ≤ 16 0.062 1.67 0.056* 1.87 
 
16 < Ceiling ≤ 20 0.032 0.94 0.036 1.20 
 
20 < Ceiling ≤ 25 0.082* 1.82 0.072** 2.09 
 
Ceiling ≥ 25 0.051 0.99 0.043 0.87 
(excluded: no 
cranes) 
Cranes − 0.093** − 2.21 − 0.073 − 1.65 
 
Rail = . 0.025 1.23 0.041* 1.85 
(excluded: no 
rail) 
Rail − 0.073** − 2.34 − 0.014 − 0.47 
(excluded: not 
owned) 
Owned 0.176*** 5.24 0.188*** 6.64 
 
Log(dist to water port) − 0.048 − 0.21 − 0.470*** − 2.84 
 
Log(dist to airport) − 0.025*** − 3.36 0.000 − 0.02 
 
Log(dist to small 
airport) 
− 0.003 − 0.23 0.001 0.21 
 
Log(dist to rail) − 0.002 − 0.20 − 0.004 − 0.59 
 
Log(dist to interstate) − 0.003 − 0.31 − 0.003 − 0.48 
 
Log(dist to intermodal) 0.019 1.65 0.007 1.11 
Market fixed 
effects 
   
x 
 
Summary Stats Number of 
observations 
2645 
 
2645 
 
 
Adjusted R2 0.544 
 
0.589 
 
Dependent variable: log(real rent per square foot per year, deflated by CPI-U). The 
standard errors for the Standard errors are robust and clustered by market. Part 1 and 
Part 2 are estimated in one regression and reported in two tables to improve readability 
only. There are 28 markets defined by CoStar. Boone County is the excluded market. 
Fixed effects estimates are provided in the Appendix. 
*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level in a t-tailed test. 
**Coefficient is significant at the 5% level in a t-tailed test. 
***Coefficient is significant at the 1% level in a t-tailed test. 
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Table 5b. Results—Part 2. 
  
Basic 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Category Variable Coefficient t-
statistics 
Coefficient t-
statistics 
Lease (excluded: 
direct leased) 
Subleased − 0.075* − 1.83 − 0.081* − 1.78 
(excluded: multi-
tenant) 
Single tenant 0.057*** 2.93 0.053** 2.38 
(excluded: net) Full service 0.082*** 3.34 0.081*** 3.38 
 
Modified gross 0.066*** 2.76 0.067*** 2.90 
(excluded: 
warehouse) 
Office 0.284*** 7.82 0.274*** 8.21 
 
Flex 0.027 0.87 0.030 1.09 
 
Retail 0.155** 2.66 0.152** 2.45 
(excluded: lease 
term < 1 year) 
Lease term = . 0.050* 1.71 0.038 1.17 
 
Lease 
term < 2 years 
− 0.003 − 0.11 − 0.015 − 0.49 
 
Lease 
term < 3 years 
− 0.010 − 0.35 − 0.020 − 0.64 
 
Lease 
term < 4 years 
0.041 1.31 0.021 0.67 
 
Lease 
term < 5 years 
0.026 0.88 0.023 0.82 
 
Lease 
term < 10 years 
0.048 1.41 0.037 1.04 
 
Lease 
term ≥ 10 years 
0.161*** 3.88 0.147*** 3.39 
Time Year ≤ 2003 0.304*** 6.61 0.283*** 6.75 
(excluded: Year = 2004 0.266*** 4.85 0.232*** 5.52 
year = 2012 – 2) Year = 2005 0.238*** 6.74 0.242*** 7.27 
 
Year = 2006 0.244*** 5.81 0.244*** 5.97 
 
Year = 2007 – 1 0.240*** 6.35 0.237*** 5.73 
 
Year = 2007 – 2 0.223*** 6.04 0.216*** 5.87 
 
Year = 2008 – 1 0.194*** 5.15 0.195*** 5.24 
 
Year = 2008 – 2 0.208*** 4.88 0.187*** 5.05 
 
Year = 2009 – 1 0.174*** 3.91 0.159*** 3.95 
 
Year = 2009 – 2 0.113** 2.58 0.096** 2.42 
 
Year = 2010 – 1 0.084* 2.03 0.075* 1.90 
 
Year = 2010 – 2 0.067 1.57 0.065 1.54 
 
Year = 2011 – 1 − 0.020 − 0.66 − 0.032 − 1.09 
 
Year = 2011 – 2 0.020 0.56 0.019 0.54 
 
Year = 2012 – 1 − 0.009 − 0.30 − 0.013 − 0.52 
Local market Nonwhite − 0.197*** − 2.91 − 0.192*** − 3.12 
 
Median age − 0.002 − 1.18 − 0.004** − 2.30 
 
Density − 0.062** − 2.08 − 0.074*** − 2.78 
 
Household size − 0.113*** − 5.32 − 0.091*** − 3.97 
 
Log(dist to 
commuter rail) 
− 0.028** − 2.23 − 0.032** − 2.32 
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Basic 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Category Variable Coefficient t-
statistics 
Coefficient t-
statistics 
 
Log(dist to city 
center) 
− 0.097 − 0.52 0.263** 2.06 
Dependent variable: log(real rent per square foot per year, deflated by CPI-U). The 
standard errors for the OLS model are robust and clustered by market. Part 1 and Part 
2 are estimated in one regression and reported in two tables to improve readability 
only. 
*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level in a t-tailed test. 
**Coefficient is significant at the 5% level in a t-tailed test. 
***Coefficient is significant at the 1% level in a t-tailed test. 
4.1. Property attributes 
The ratio of parking spaces per 1000 square feet of leasable 
space, parking ratio, is an important part of an industrial property's 
characteristics. As noted above, since many of the spaces did not 
report the parking ratio, this variable is specified using a series of 
dummy variables with leases in properties with parking ratios greater 
than 2 being the excluded category. The results show that having less 
than one parking space per 1000 square feet of leasable space reduces 
the rent by approximately 10% as compared to the excluded category. 
This discount shrinks as the parking ratio increases and is statistically 
insignificant for the 1.5 to 2 category. The ability of trucks to drive into 
the property also imparts a rent premium. A one standard deviation 
increase (0.24) in the number of drive-ins per thousands of leasable 
square feet increases rent by 2.64%. The age of the property, year 
built, also has the expected sign and is statistically significant. 
Buildings that have been built more recently command higher rent. 
Each ten years is worth approximately a 4% premium. 9 Bigger leases 
are associated with lower rents, with the point estimate showing that a 
10% increase in square footage decreases rents by approximately 
1.5%. The ceiling height coefficients are of the expected sign and are 
statistically significant at the 10% level or better for two of the six 
categories. However, there is no evidence of a linear monotonic 
relationship between height and real rents. The existence of rail and a 
crane on the property is statistically insignificant. Property that is 
owned and rented by the same entity tends to pay substantial rent 
premiums (i.e., 18.8% higher). Lastly, despite the obvious clustering 
of the industrial properties around airports, highways, and rail 
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infrastructure, nearly all of the coefficients on the distance variables 
are insignificant. Since distance measures are in log form, the 
coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. The distance to airports is 
negative and significant only when market fixed effects are not 
included, but even then the magnitude of the coefficient is very small. 
The coefficient for the distance for water ports is significant once fixed 
effects are included but given the sparsity of warehouses locating near 
water ports this result likely reflect other unobserved factors. We 
explore the transportation effects in more detail later in the paper. 
4.2. Lease attributes 
Table 5b reports the results for the lease attributes, the year 
dummy variables, and the local neighborhood features. Leases where 
the tenant pays the operating expenses pay the lowest rent. When the 
landlord pays for the operating expenses, tenants pay approximately 
an 8.1% rent premium, and leases where the landlord and tenant have 
an expense sharing arrangement pay a smaller premium of 
approximately 7%. As expected, single tenants pay a premium (i.e., 
5%) and subleased space pays a discount but the latter coefficient is 
only barely statistically significant. 
The use of the space has substantial impacts on rents. For 
example, office space use pays a premium over warehouse space use 
of just over 27% and retail use pays a premium of 15%. The results 
also provide some limited support for a term structure for leases. 
However, there is only evidence of a term related rent premium when 
the term is 10 years or longer, with a 15% premium. The shape of the 
term structure will be examined in more detail in a following section. 
4.3. Local neighborhood characteristics 
Tenants located in neighborhoods with more nonwhite 
households, more dense populations, larger households, and those 
further from public transportation all pay less in real rents. Specifically, 
a 10% increase in the nonwhite population reduces rents 1.9%, 
whereas an additional 1000 persons per square mile in the census 
tract lowers rents approximately 0.7%. An additional one-half person 
per household (note this is more than a one standard deviation 
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change) reduces rents 4.5%, whereas a doubling of the distance to a 
commuter rail station reduces rents by over 6%. Interestingly, these 
results are similar to those found in a study of single-family residential 
home values in Chicago in 1999 by Immergluck and Smith (2006). 
They find negative impacts of minority population and a negative 
(albeit steeper) distance gradient for public transportation. In contrast 
to our findings, they actually find a positive impact of population 
density on residential sale prices after controlling for other 
neighborhood attributes. Presumably, the amenity effects that are 
likely proxied by density outweigh the congestion effects for 
residential, but not industrial properties. 
4.4. Time period dummies and a constant quality rent 
index 
The year dummy variables can provide an estimate of how rents 
have increased or decreased over time after controlling for all the 
attributes in the estimation. With a reasonably specified model, the 
results can be interpreted as constant quality and lease type rents. Not 
surprisingly, the results indicate that constant quality real rents have 
taken a dramatic drop from their peak in 2006. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the results. Three measures of real rents are 
presented for the Chicago metropolitan area. Each of the rents is 
normalized to one in 2006. The first index (asking) is the average 
asking rents for warehouses reported by Cushman and Wakefield, 
which is the most easily obtained type of market information. It is 
published quarterly and is widely used by market participants. The 
data begin in 2006. Asking rents rise by 1% by the first half of 2008 
and then drop by a little more than 20% through the end of 2012. The 
asking rents also appear smoother (less volatile) than the other 
measures. The second index (transactions) is the average rent on the 
transactions used in the estimation. It peaks in 2007 and rose over 
5% from the benchmark 2006 level. However, through the first half of 
2009 the transactions index shows no sign of a consistent decline. By 
the end of 2012 however, it declines by over 30% from peak. The third 
index (constant quality) is the estimated results from the fixed effects 
specification of the hedonic model reported in Table 5a and Table 5b. 
This index is calculated by holding all continuous variables at their 
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mean, for Boone County (i.e., one of the submarkets identified by 
CoStar), and all categorical variables at the category indicated by its 
mean value. The constant quality index shows almost no run up in real 
rents from 2004 through 2006 and a decline of rents by over 5% by 
the end of 2008. The timing of the market cycle is substantially 
different for the constant quality rent index and it leads the raw 
transactions rents and asking rents. From the peak, the constant 
quality index drops to a low in the first half of 2011 that is almost 25% 
lower than the peak. The other indexes do not show the drop during 
the summer of 2011, which is likely associated with the first debt 
ceiling crisis as the recovery stalled. The constant quality index also 
shows that rents may have started to flatten out in 2012. In contrast, 
the asking rents and the transactions rents have continued or even 
increased their pace of decline during 2012. Again, this is evidence 
that typical rent indexes miss the turning points of the market and 
provide faulty market signals to market participants at critical points in 
the market cycle.10 
 
Fig. 2. Three measures of real rents. 
Rents are expressed as dollars per square foot per year. All rents are normalized to 1 
2006 because this is the year that the estimation data has an ample number of 
observations. Constant quality is the predicted real rent in each time period holding all 
continuous variables at their means. Categorical variables are set to 1 for the category 
where the mean value exists. The market is set to CoStar's submarket 1, which is 
Boone County. Transactions is the average of the observed real rent transactions in 
each time period used in the estimation data set. Asking is the Cushman and 
Wakefield average real net rate for warehouse industrial property. The data were 
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downloaded from www.cushwake.com “Market Beat Chicago Industrial Report,” which 
is published quarterly—for most quarters. 
Fig. 3 plots the constant quality real rent index, the Chicago 
industrial property vacancy rate reported by Costar, and the effective 
rent calculated by multiplying the constant quality real rental rate by 
the occupancy rate for Chicago. The rents are indexed to 1 in 2006. 
The figure shows a clear inverse relationship between vacancy and 
rents with well synchronized turning points. The effective rent proxy 
shows, as compared to the constant quality index, a larger and faster 
drop in rents. However, in proportional terms, the impact of vacancy is 
small compared to the drop in the rent on occupied space. 
 
Fig. 3. Constant quality real effective rents and vacancy rates. 
Rents are expressed as dollars per square foot per year. All rents are normalized to 1 
2006 because this is the year that the estimation data has an ample number of 
observations. Constant quality is the predicted real rent in each time period holding all 
continuous variables at their means. Categorical variables are set to 1 for the category 
where the mean value exists. The market is set to CoStar's submarket 1, which is 
Boone County. The vacancy rate is the CoStar reported vacancy rate for the 
metropolitan area. Effective rent is the estimated by multiplying the constant quality 
rent by the vacancy rate. 
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Fig. A1. CoStar submarket areas. 
Chicago industrial submarket overview, CoStar Group, Copyright 1997–2006. These 
market numbers do not match those used for the fixed effects reported in the results. 
Some markets are combined for estimation purposes (preserving within market area 
variation of explanatory variables). 
In summary, the constant quality index provides a substantially 
different view of market rents than simple averages calculated from 
reported transactions or asking rents. It shows a smaller run up in 
rents, a larger decline than asking rents, and an earlier timing of the 
peaks and troughs of the cycle. 
4.5. Distance to transportation infrastructure 
Since the distances to transportation infrastructure results were 
largely insignificant in the prior specification even though there is 
substantial clustering of properties around airports and rail lines, we 
consider the possibility that the impact of airports on real rents is 
nonlinear. Table 6 attempts to identify any spatial relationships not 
captured by the log-linear specification. For each type or mode of 
transportation a series of dummy variables is used indicating the 
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distance to a specific type of transportation mode. The coefficients 
reported are from separate regression results for each mode. For 
example, all the rail results are estimated in one regression. The 
distance dummy variables are derived from the distribution of 
distance. The closest 1%, 5%, 25%, and median were all tested and 
the most “successful” specifications are reported. For example, there is 
approximately a 5% premium in rents for property that is within 
0.5 miles of a major airport, but no premium beyond that. This result 
is driven mostly by O'Hare airport where the premium is 7% for 
properties within 0.5 miles and is not found for Midway. The results 
also may reflect the unique characteristics of O'Hare—longer runways 
for airplanes to land on, more runways, international travel, and 
heavier air traffic. These findings are consistent with the clustering of 
property around O'Hare airport seen in Fig. 1. The results on Midway 
are all statistically insignificant. 
Table 6. Distance to transportation infrastructure specification tests. 
 Coefficient t-statistics 
Major airports   
 Distance < 0.5 0.049*** 2.83 
 0.5 ≤ Distance < 1.0 − 0.055 − 1.27 
 1.0 ≤ Distance < 2.0 − 0.034** − 2.38 
O'Hare   
 Distance < 0.5 0.068*** 3.57 
 0.5 ≤ Distance < 1.0 − 0.013 − 0.53 
 1.0 ≤ Distance < 2.0 − 0.024 − 1.30 
Midway   
 Distance < 0.5 0.052 0.36 
 0.5 ≤ Distance < 1.0 − 0.206 − 1.40 
 1.0 ≤ Distance < 2.0 − 0.032 − 0.64 
Rail   
 Distance < 0.02 − 0.001 − 0.03 
 0.02 ≤ Distance < 0.04 0.023 0.65 
 0.04 ≤ Distance < 0.10 0.014 0.70 
 0.10 ≤ Distance < 0.14 − 0.014 − 0.68 
Interstate highway   
 Distance < 0.20 0.050* 1.79 
 0.20 ≤ Distance < 0.50 − 0.002 − 0.07 
Water ports   
 Distance < 4 0.048 0.45 
 4 ≤ Distance < 6 − 0.144* − 1.74 
 6 ≤ Distance < 18 0.013 0.25 
 18 ≤ Distance < 22 0.045 0.96 
Intermodal points   
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 Coefficient t-statistics 
 Distance < 0.07 − 0.004 − 0.14 
 0.07 ≤ Distance < 0.20 − 0.022 − 0.54 
 0.20 ≤ Distance < 0.80 − 0.005 − 0.23 
Distance is measured in miles. The set of dummy variables for each type (for example 
all dummy variables associated with water ports) of infrastructure is tested separately 
and added to the fixed effects results reported in Table 5. 
*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level in a t-tailed test. 
**Coefficient is significant at the 5% level in a t-tailed test. 
***Coefficient is significant at the 1% level in a t-tailed test. 
There is little or no evidence that the clustering around other 
transportation infrastructure (i.e., rails, water ports, or intermodal 
points) is capitalized into real rents. The coefficients on the distance 
dummies for rail and intermodal points are all insignificant. This is a 
surprising result because the vast majority of industrial properties are 
close to rail lines. Approximately 25% of our properties are within 0.11 
of a mile from a rail line and 50% are within 0.30 of a mile. Many of 
these industrial buildings back onto, or face, a rail line. One potential 
explanation is that other potential users of the location (e.g., hotel, 
apartment, single family home, or retail) may be more sensitive to the 
disamenities associated with being near transportation infrastructure. 
These factors include air quality, noise, vibrations, and light (especially 
during the nighttime hours). As a result, industrial property naturally 
outbids other property types for locations close to rail lines, intermodal 
points, and airports (except O'Hare). 
In addition, only one of the water port coefficients (i.e., 
properties within 4 to 6 miles) is statistically significant and is negative 
indicating that real rents are actually lower than properties in a 4 to 6 
mile distance. At least in this sample, industrial property is not 
clustered around water ports. This result likely is derived from 
unmeasured features of those neighborhoods 4 to 6 miles distance to 
the ports. There is some weak evidence that being very close to an 
interstate highway is associated with a 5% premium. This likely 
reflects the benefits of being near to the road system used in trucking. 
4.6. Lease term structure 
Table 7 provides some additional evidence that leases pay rent 
premiums when the leases last a long time. We also test to see if the 
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term structure premium is stable through the business cycle. If long-
term leases reflect market expectations about future short term rental 
rates then the term structure may be positively sloped in some time 
periods and negatively sloped in different time periods. However, the 
results only find a positively sloped term structure. 
Table 7. Lease term structure specification tests. 
 Coefficient t-statistics 
Lease term   
 1. Lease years 0.019*** 4.14 
 2. Log(lease years) 0.047** 2.33 
Lease term by time   
 3. Lease years   
 2003–2006 0.012* 1.86 
 2007–2008 0.007 0.52 
 2009–2010 0.023*** 3.62 
 2010–2012 0.023*** 3.60 
 4. Log(lease years)   
 2003–2006 0.039 1.19 
 2007–2008 0.024 0.53 
 2009–2010 0.057** 2.07 
 2010–2012 0.051** 2.14 
Four different specifications are tested as indicated by the number in the first column. 
The base specification is the fixed effects results reported in Table 5 except that the 
continuous version of lease term is included. This reduces the sample to 1,442 leases. 
All other unreported coefficient estimates are economically similar. 
*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level in a t-tailed test. 
**Coefficient is significant at the 5% level in a t-tailed test. 
***Coefficient is significant at the 1% level in a t-tailed test. 
To test for the stability of the results over time a continuous 
version of the lease term is included. This reduces the sample size to a 
little over 1440 lease transactions but allows a more parsimonious 
specification. The regression results indicate that longer term leases, 
whether measured in years or in the log of years, are associated with 
higher rental rates. In particular, the log specification indicates that a 
10% increase in lease term is associated with a 0.5% increase in 
rents. The linear specification indicates that an increase in the lease 
term by 3 years is also associated with an increase in rents of 
approximately 0.6%. 
The next part of the table tests for the stability of the results 
through the business cycle. Under the expectations hypothesis, rents 
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on long-term leases reflect expectations of future short term lease 
rents. Therefore, if expectations of future rents change we should also 
expect the shape of the lease term structure to change. To test for 
this, the next set of results interact lease term with different time 
periods (i.e., years when the lease starts). All specifications show that 
the term structure is steepest in 2009 through 2012 and flatter and 
statistically insignificant in 2007 and 2008. Consistent with the 
expectations hypothesis, at the peak and turning point of the rents the 
term structure was its flattest. However, by 2009, the market started 
to experience a steeper term structure but rents continued to decline. 
In summary, the lease term results indicate an upward sloping 
term structure. Longer leases pay a premium. However, the premium 
varies during the business cycle and is at its largest after the peak of 
the cycle. There are two alternative interpretations of this result. The 
first is that under the expectations hypothesis these results indicate 
that market participants did adjust rental rate expectations around the 
peak of the market; however, after the decline continued, participants 
became too optimistic about a recovery in the market. An alternative 
is that landlords perceived more market risk as the depth of the 
recession became apparent and see greater risk for long-term 
commitments. Therefore landlords required higher risk premiums. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to identify which of these two 
interpretations is more correct, but both perceptions of risk and 
perception of future rental rates likely vary systematically over the 
business cycle. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper estimates a hedonic model of commercial industrial 
property rents in the Chicago metropolitan area. From the results, we 
create a constant quality index of industrial property rents and find 
that rents declined by almost 25% from the peak in 2008 to trough in 
the first half of 2011. Since then rents have rebounded a little. The use 
of asking and average rents is shown to miss and lag market turning 
points. There is also evidence that average rents overstated the run up 
in rents before the peak and over stated the reduction in rents as they 
declined. 
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The hedonic results indicate the importance of creating a 
constant quality rent index that holds constant both property, location, 
and lease characteristics. In particular, the attributes of the property 
and lease performed as expected, with more parking, more drive-ins, 
newer buildings, and smaller leases (in terms of square feet leased) all 
being associated with rent premiums. Industrial property used for 
warehouse space pays the lowest rent while space used for office and 
retail space pays higher rates. Full service leases pay premiums 
relative to net leases and long-term leases also pay substantial 
premiums. Leases with longer terms tend to pay a premium but it was 
smallest at the peak of the cycle and largest a few years after the 
peak. These results likely reflect systematic changes in rental rate 
expectations and perceptions of risk over the cycle. 
Measures such as access to the interstate highway system, rail 
lines, intermodal points, and airports are shown to provide little 
explanatory power despite the clustering of property around these 
transportation modes. The premiums that are identified are highly 
nonlinear. For example, rent premiums are found for only being very 
close (within one-half a mile) to O'Hare airport. There was no 
consistent relationship between rent and being close to the other 
major airports in the region (Midway and Mitchell airport in nearby 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin). Similarly, the benefits of locating near to an 
interstate highway are small. There is also no rent premium associated 
with being close to a rail road line, a water port on Lake Michigan or an 
intermodal point, a location where goods can change modes of 
transportation (for example, rail to air, or port). We interpret these 
results as indicating that industrial warehouses may have had 
productive reasons for locating close to transportation infrastructure in 
the past but these confer few financial benefits today. Instead, the 
disamenities created by noise, vibrations, and pollution of major 
transportation arteries or nodes cancel out any benefits (productivity 
or non-property cost). In contrast, transportation for workers and 
other local market characteristics do seem to be capitalized into lease 
rents as an effective worker amenity. 
Appendix A.  
In the OLS model, the errors, γ, are assumed to be randomly 
distributed with mean zero and constant variance. For the spatial error 
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model (SEM), γ is related to spatially proximate errors through the 
weight matrix, W. Specifically, the error becomes: γ = λWγ + ξ, where 
W is the normalized spatial weight matrix, λ is the spatial error 
coefficient, and ξ is a random error term with zero mean and constant 
variance. Note that if λ = 0, then the SEM defaults to the OLS model. 
A spatial weight matrix is used to define contiguity as the 10 closest 
neighbors in the sample. Two spatial models were initially explored: 
the spatial autoregressive model (SAR) and the spatial error model 
(SEM). 
The Lagrange multiplier-lag (LM-Lag) and Lagrange multiplier-
error (LM-Error) tests were both significant, but the robust LM-Error 
test gave a higher significance level tan the robust LM-Lag test, 
suggesting that the SEM model is preferred. The SEM was estimated 
employing the general methods of moments method of estimation. The 
findings are nearly identical to those SEM estimates generated using 
maximum likelihood. The Moran I test on the residuals of the OLS 
model indicated that the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation 
can be rejected (Moran I = 0.1673; p-value = 0.00). 
Table A1. Part 1: spatial error model (SEM) results—property 
characteristics. 
Category Variable Coefficient t-score 
 Intercept − 3.0807*** − 3.859 
Property Parking ratio = . − 0.0461*** − 2.705 
(excluded: park ratio > 2) Parking ratio ≤ 1.0 − 0.1025*** − 5.259 
 1.0 < Parking ratio < = 1.5 − 0.0666*** − 3.637 
 1.5 < Parking ratio < = 2.0 − 0.0077 − 0.327 
 No. drive-ins/1000 square feet 0.1030*** 3.917 
 Year built (100s) 0.0036*** 9.009 
 Log(lease square feet) − 0.1513*** − 23.495 
(excluded: ceiling < = 12) Ceiling = . 0.0417 1.349 
 12 < Ceiling ≤ 14 0.0356 1.632 
 14 < Ceiling ≤ 16 0.0649*** 2.906 
 16 < Ceiling ≤ 20 0.0409* 1.795 
 20 < Ceiling ≤ 25 0.0924*** 3.375 
 Ceiling ≥ 25 0.0755** 2.319 
(excluded: no cranes) Cranes − 0.0851*** − 2.947 
 Rail = . 0.0321** 2.182 
(excluded: no rail) Rail − 0.0166 − 0.711 
(excluded: not owned) Owned 0.1939*** 4.720 
 Log(dist to water port) − 0.1846 − 0.915 
 Log(dist to airport) − 0.0221*** − 2.581 
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Category Variable Coefficient t-score 
 Intercept − 3.0807*** − 3.859 
 Log(dist to small airport) − 0.0048 − 0.521 
 Log(dist to rail) 0.0009 0.167 
 Log(dist to interstate) − 0.0010 − 0.134 
 Log(dist to intermodal) 0.0148 1.635 
Summary stats Number of observations 2645  
 Adjusted R2 0.5854  
Dependent variable: log(real rent per square foot per year, deflated by CPI-U). Part 1 
and Part 2 are estimated in one regression and reported in two tables to improve 
readability only. 
*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level in a t-tailed test. 
**Coefficient is significant at the 5% level in a t-tailed test. 
***Coefficient is significant at the 1% level in a t-tailed test. 
 
Table A1. Part 2: spatial error model (SEM) results. 
Category Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
Lease (excluded: direct leased) Subleased − 0.0632 − 1.552 
(excluded: multi-tenant) Single tenant 0.0456*** 2.552 
(excluded: net) Full service 0.0808*** 4.561 
 Modified gross 0.0682*** 4.789 
(excluded: warehouse) Office 0.3019*** 10.091 
 Flex 0.0063 0.184 
 Retail 0.1464*** 2.990 
(excluded: lease term < 1 year) Lease term = . 0.0350 1.415 
 Lease term < 2 years − 0.0227 − 0.807 
 Lease term < 3 years − 0.0167 − 0.655 
 Lease term < 4 years 0.0218 0.697 
 Lease term < 5 years 0.0120 0.368 
 Lease term < 10 years 0.0378 1.407 
 Lease term ≥ 10 years 0.1409*** 4.011 
Time Year ≤ 2003 0.3504*** 7.361 
(excluded: Year = 2004 0.2847*** 5.750 
year = 2012 – 2) Year = 2005 0.2687*** 5.558 
 Year = 2006 0.2926*** 6.441 
 Year = 2007 – 1 0.2720*** 6.121 
 Year = 2007 – 2 0.2632*** 6.087 
 Year = 2008 – 1 0.2271*** 5.418 
 Year = 2008 – 2 0.2171*** 5.125 
 Year = 2009 – 1 0.1816*** 4.456 
 Year = 2009 – 2 0.1229*** 3.120 
 Year = 2010 – 1 0.0876** 2.283 
 Year = 2010 – 2 0.0754** 1.971 
 Year = 2011 – 1 − 0.0257 − 0.680 
 Year = 2011 – 2 0.0231 0.601 
 Year = 2012 – 1 0.0026 0.067 
Local market Nonwhite − 0.1834** − 3.421 
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Category Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
 Median age − 0.0015 − 0.829 
 Density − 0.0681*** − 3.166 
 Household size − 0.0871*** − 3.616 
 Log(dist to commuter rail) − 0.0299*** − 2.579 
 Log(dist to city center) 0.0132 0.075 
Spatial error lag Lambda 0.5079*** 4.335 
Dependent variable: log(real rent per square foot per year, deflated by CPI-U). Part 1 
and Part 2 are estimated in one regression and reported in two tables to improve 
readability only. 
*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level in a t-tailed test. 
**Coefficient is significant at the 5% level in a t-tailed test. 
***Coefficient is significant at the 1% level in a t-tailed test. 
 
Table A2. Submarket areas and fixed effects estimates. 
Market Description Coefficient t-statistics 
mkt1 Boone County Excluded  
mkt2 Central Kane/Dupage − 0.226**** − 4.46 
mkt3 Central Will − 0.311*** − 5.86 
mkt4 Far South Cook − 0.336*** − 6.15 
mkt5 Grundy County − 0.346*** − 10.29 
 I-39 Corridor LaSalle, Winnebago, Lee, and Ogle Counties   
mkt7 I-88 West − 0.279*** − 6.49 
mkt8 Indiana − 0.346*** − 4.88 
mkt9 Jasper County − 0.469*** − 6.08 
mkt10 Joliet Area − 0.342*** − 7.04 
mkt11 Kenosha East and West − 0.288*** − 3.94 
mkt12 McHenry County − 0.425*** − 7.92 
mkt13 Near SW Suburbs − 0.387*** − 4.14 
mkt14 Near South Cook − 0.347*** − 4.46 
mkt15 North Chicago − 0.173 − 1.45 
mkt16 North Cook − 0.113 − 1.34 
mkt17 North DuPage − 0.139** − 2.39 
mkt18 North I-55 − 0.283*** − 3.45 
mkt19 North Kane/I-90 − 0.189*** − 5.07 
mkt20 North Lake County − 0.250*** − 5.72 
mkt21 Northwest Cook − 0.130** − 2.12 
mkt22 O'Hare − 0.174** − 2.34 
mkt23 Porter County − 0.584*** − 10.96 
mkt24 South Chicago − 0.509*** − 4.19 
mkt25 South I-55 − 0.196*** − 3.80 
mkt26 South Lake County − 0.175*** − 3.25 
mkt27 West Cook North and South − 0.189** − 2.15 
mkt28 West Suburbs − 0.185** − 2.72 
mkt29 Other 0.012 0.15 
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These are submarkets within the Chicago metropolitan area as defined by CoStar. See 
Fig. A1 for a map of these submarkets. These are the fixed effects estimates for 
Table 5a and Table 5b. 
*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level in a t-tailed test. 
**Coefficient is significant at the 5% level in a t-tailed test. 
***Coefficient is significant at the 1% level in a t-tailed test. 
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1Tel.: + 1 414 288 3339. 
2According to the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals 
(CSCMP), expenditures on transportation were $688 billion (4.8% of GDP) 
and the cost of logistics was $1.1 trillion (7.7% of GDP) in the United 
States in 2009 (http://cscmp.org/press/fastfacts.asp). 
3A different line of research more explicitly measures the supply and demand 
for space. For example, Blank and Winnick (1953) developed a model of 
the relationship between rents and vacancy rates in the housing market 
and the importance of unoccupied space and rents has been studied 
extensively, particularly for the US office markets (e.g., Shilling et al., 
1987, and Wheaton and Torto, 1988). There is strong empirical evidence 
that rents go down when vacancy rates increase and employment 
decreases and that there is persistence in how rents evolve over time 
(Wheaton et al., 1997 and Brounen and Jennen, 2009). 
4Commercial property rents have also been studied using different 
approaches, including first, a structural and stock adjustment framework 
at a micro or property level (e.g., Benjamin et al., 1998 and Wheaton et 
al., 1997); second, an error correction model that identifies long-run 
relationships and short-run dynamic responses to deviations from 
equilibrium in the same specification at the aggregate level (e.g., 
Hendershott et al., 2002a, Hendershott et al., 2002b, Brounen and 
Jennen, 2009 and De Francesco, 2008); third, repeat-sales transactions 
(e.g., Wheaton et al., 2009); and fourth, the Poisson model (e.g., Anglin, 
1994, Williams, 1998 and Buttimer and Ott, 2007). 
5Distance is measured as the shortest distance to the identified shape, 
boundary, or single point. 
6When considering amenities, this highest and best use axiom of urban 
location models implies that a more amenable location will be residential if 
the amenities are more highly valued by residential users than by 
industrial users, all else equal. 
7The SEM was estimated employing the general methods of moments method 
of estimation. The findings are nearly identical to those SEM estimates 
generated using maximum likelihood. 
8Work by McMillan and Redfearn (2010) suggests that nonparametric 
methods such as geographically weighted regression (GWR) may be more 
efficient than OLS with locational fixed effects. Unfortunately, given the 
relatively small sample size, GWR proved to be unworkable in this 
application since subsamples did not permit inclusion of all categorical 
variables of interest (i.e., time dummies, lease term dummies, and 
structural dummies) unless the bandwidth was set to be overly inclusive. 
Thus, we include OLS with locational fixed effects, recognizing a potential 
loss of efficiency. 
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9Additional specification tests allowed the relationship between building age 
and rents to be nonlinear. The results indicate that, relative to newer 
building built in the 2000s, very old buildings have large discounts of 18% 
to over 30% and buildings built in the 1960s through the 1980s have 
similar discounts ranging from 10 to 13%, while buildings built in the 
1990s have a discount of 8%. Hence, we find no evidence that very old 
buildings have a premium or an attenuation of the discount. 
10To illustrate the precision of the index results see the coefficient estimates 
and the 95% confidence intervals below. 
 
Year Coefficient Lower CI 95% Upper CI 95% 
Year ≤ 2003 0.283 0.197 0.368 
Year = 2004 0.232 0.146 0.318 
Year = 2005 0.242 0.174 0.310 
Year = 2006 0.244 0.160 0.327 
Year = 2007 — 1 0.237 0.152 0.322 
Year = 2007 — 2 0.216 0.141 0.292 
Year = 2008 — 1 0.195 0.119 0.272 
Year = 2008 — 2 0.187 0.111 0.263 
Year = 2009 — 1 0.159 0.077 0.242 
Year = 2009 — 2 0.096 0.015 0.178 
Year = 2010 — 1 0.075 − 0.006 0.155 
Year = 2010 — 2 0.065 − 0.022 0.151 
Year = 2011 — 1 − 0.032 − 0.093 0.029 
Year = 2011 — 2 0.019 − 0.053 0.090 
Year = 2012 — 1 − 0.013 − 0.067 0.040 
 
 
